Although the theory of negative dialectics is hardly the stuff of dinner party conversation, I want to explain why it should be.  

Formulated by the 20th century German philosopher, Theodor Adorno, it is essentially a critique of the tendency in Western culture to oversimplify the world by categorising the objects around us into a system of general concepts. He called this process “identity thinking”.  

Whilst Adorno accepted that we need to engage in this type of thinking in order to make sense of our complex social world, he also warned of its limitations. The main drawback is our failure to understand that there is always an element of the object that cannot be reduced to a concept. As a result, we never fully capture the reality that it is meant to represent.  

Take biological sex as a good example. Research has found that it is the most pervasive method of categorising people into male and female. However, by virtue of insisting that everyone has to fall into one of two human sexes, we deny the possibility that some do not.  

The current debate around trans ideology is testament to just how problematic the consequences can be. Consider the fallout from the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court with regard to the meaning of the words “woman” and “sex” under equalities legislation. Its conclusion that “woman” means anyone who was born female while sex refers to someone’s biology has reinforced the idea that there cannot be anything other than two fixed and immutable models – male and female.  

That is not to criticise the court. After all, it only did what it was asked to do which was to decide the issue from a binary perspective. It was not therefore able to take into account the fact that about two per cent of people are estimated to have intersex variations. That is, people whose sexual characteristics do not fit fixed notions of male or female bodies.  

Indeed, the experiences of intersex individuals underline Adorno’s point that every object in the universe has something unique about it which means it cannot be categorised by conceptual thought. It follows that there is always something that remains, something that is left over after we have tried to categorise it. It is this unique, particular quality that constitutes what Adorno calls its non-identical aspect which we often overlook or ignore, especially if it does not fit with what we think we already know about the world.  

Of course, some would argue that it is just common sense to conclude that sex (in other words, the body) is a biological fact and not a concept, unlike gender identity. Although that’s a debate for another day, suffice to say here that Adorno and feminist philosophers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler have argued that as our bodies carry so many cultural meanings, it is not possible to understand and represent sex separately from gender. Indeed, it is a little-known fact that the term “sex” was only invented sometime in the eighteenth century, while the term “gender” did not originate until the mid-1950s.  

Given Adorno’s argument that the world is far too messy and contradictory to be neatly summed up within static categories, he suggests that we engage instead in what he called “non-identity thinking”, the core idea at the heart of his theory of negative dialectics. This differed from the approach put forward previously by other philosophers, such as Friedrich Hegel, who argued that reason could only be achieved when subject and object were unified. Adorno, on the other hand, said that is not possible.  

Instead, he argued that it is only by exposing the tension between the object and the concept attributed to it that we are offered a gap through which an understanding of difference and tolerance can emerge. It is by staying in the discomfort that we learn to resist the temptation to pin down our experiences through our need for fixed concepts.  

So rather than always trying to resolve the contradictions that beset the world, Adorno urges us to become more open to them. In that way, we can develop a better understanding of the world and all its injustices. At the same time, we can acknowledge its messiness, tensions and contradictions without rushing to smooth them over. 

By becoming more critically reflexive, he hopes that we can become more conscious of the degree to which we engage in identity thinking. Once aware of this tendency, we can start to focus on the actual process by which we think in binary or identitarian terms, allowing us hopefully to engage more in non-identity thinking. 

Adorno does not promise that this type of thinking will turn the world into some version of paradise. However, he does suggest that by acknowledging the real pain and suffering that we all experience, we will be better able to confront it without feeling the need to resort to easy explanations or false stories about who to blame.  

Although Adorno’s theory is open to criticisms of utopianism, it is worth remembering that abstract discussions and considerations can – and often do - lead to social change through a process of exploration and analysis of the complex ideas that sustain dominant ideologies.  

Given the conflicts being experienced by different peoples all over the world today, his philosophy could hardly be more prescient or needed. Perhaps if we allowed for the possibility that we actually know very little and understand even less, we might stop jumping to conclusions and the world would be a better and happier place as a result. 

Unfortunately, Adorno’s theory has not had the necessary exposure to bring about this new way of thinking. I therefore hope my essay will help to rectify that situation so that, in time, more people practise it and bring about the positive impact that it can have on our society.  

Adorno, T.W. 1973. Negative Dialectics, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 

Adorno, T.W. 2008. Lectures on Negative Dialectics, Cambridge, Polity Press 

Butler, J. 1990. Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity, New York, Routledge 

De Beauvoir, S. 2011. The Second Sex, New York, Vintage 

Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of spirit, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press